This paper studies optimal fiscal policy in an economy where heterogeneous agents with uncertain lifetimes coexist. We show that some plausible social welfare functions lead to time-inconsistent optimal plans, and we suggest restrictions on social preferences that avoid the problem. The normative prescriptions of a time-consistent utilitarian planner generalize the 'two-part Golden Rule" suggested by Samuelson, and imply aggregate dynamics similar to those arising in the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey optimal growth framework. We characterize lump-sum transfer schemes that allow the optimal allocation to be decentralized as the competitive equilibrium of an economy with actuarially fair annuities. The lump-sum transfers that accomplish this decentralization are age dependent in general.
Introduction
This paper studies the idea of optimal fiscal policy in an economy riare h'eterogenous generations with uncertain lifetimes coexistS A groinq iterature studies the effects of SQCjCl security and government debt issue in economies of this type, but it stops short of describing ;rv intartemporal social welfare function that might justify the use of fical tool;. Our primary concern is therefore the dynamic resource allocation chosen by a utilitarian planner who weighs the welfare of both existing and future generations. The basic model of the individual comes from Yaari (196S) .
Specification of an intertemporal social welfare function is compilcated by the possibility that optimal plans are dynamically inconsistent in tne sense of Strotz (1956) . This possibility arises in any model with overlapping generations. Below we show that sonic plausible social welfare functions lead to time-inconsistency1 and suggest restrictions on social preferences that avoid the problem.
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For recant applications of uncertain-lifetime models to fiscaloo1icy questions, see Abel (1985 1 and Eck'stein, Ei chenbaum, and Pci ed (1983) among others. Open-economy aspects of BIanchards (1985) model are studied by Buiter (1934) 1 Frenkel and Razin c1984) • and Giovannini (1984) . Early applications of 'i'aari s (1965) setup include Merton (1971) and Tobin (1967) .
An intertecnporal welfare aflaiysis alonq the lines of that presented here has been veinped by Samuelson (1967 Samuelson ( , 1968 in the corite<t of Diamond's (1965) deterministic overlappinq-qe'erations model with capital. However, special assumptions made by amuelson obscure the potential for time incons:stency. It is therefore noteworthy that the normative prescriptions o our time-consistent utilitarian planner generalize those suggested by Samuelson. Moreover, the aggregate dynamics implied by an optimal plan are qualitatively similar to those crivi hy r:c Ii) knnrn;nc (19A>, nd Rmsy H97P) in rnndc with identical3 non-overlapping generations. We characterize lump-sun transfer scheme; that allow the optimal allocation to be decentralized through a competitive economy with actuarially fair annuities.
An important finding of the paper is that the above-mentioned transfers are in general age dependent. It follows that the aggregative fiscal policies studied in the recent literature will usually fail to achieve the optimal allocation. If first-best fiscal policy tools are unavailableq however, the door is opened to the type of generalequilibrium time inconsistency studied by Kydland and Prescott (1977>, Calvo (1978) , and others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the individual's problem and the competitive equilibrium of an economy in which there is no uncertainty at the aggregate level. Section II takes up utilitarian planning and the time-consistency problem. In section III the allocation chosen by a time-consistent utilitarian planner is characterized. Section IV discusses lump-sum redistribution schemes that Phelps and Riley (1978) study the Rawlsian 'maximin' case. Abel (1984) uses .Sarnuelson's criterion to evaluate steady-state welfare in overlaping-generations models with money.
replicate the planner'; preferred allocation as a competitive equllibrium. Section V is a brief summary of the result;.
C;ompetitive Equilibrium with Annuities
To make the paer self-contained, this section briefly reviews the interteinporal alloctian problem of an individual with an uncertain lifetime who purchases actuarially fair annuities. While the conclusions merely repeat those of Yaari (1965) , the presentation of the problem is slightly different and hopefully more transparent. The section conclude;
by describing the economy's aqgregate dynamics in perfect-foresight
equilibrium.
An individual born at time v (his 'vintage) is uncertain about the length N of hi; life. Let F(.) denote the cumulative distribution function of the random variable N, so that F(n) ProbCN n). Of course, F(O) = 0 and lie F(n) = 1. Implicit in our notation is the assumption that the distibution of N does not depend on vz in addition FL) is assumed to be continuous and piecewise differentiable with an associated probability density function +L) satisfying F(n> = SF(s)ds.
Individuals maximize the expected value over possible lifespan; of a discounted integral of future instantaneous utilities. The time-t utility of a vintage-v individual is a function u(.) of consumption c(v,t).4 If denotes the constant subjective discount rate, expected lifetime utility for an agent born on date v is
The function u(.) is assumed to be bounded, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Notice that u(.) is assumed to be independent of v. Only consumption paths c(v,.) that are piecewise continuous and right-hand differentiable are considered. To ensure interior solutions, the usual Inada conditions are imposed.
After integrating by parts, (1) can be written in trie form
where 1 -F(t-v) is just the probability that an individual born on date v is alive on date t.
Define p(n) to be the instantaneous death probability faced by an individual of age n:
Because 4(n) = F'(n) and NO) = 0, (3) implies
The objective function (2) therefore takes the form
As in Yaari (1965) , the possibility of death leads to a higher subjective discount rate on future utility.
Assume now, as in Blanchard's (1985) 
In (6), a(v,t) is the overall time-t wealth of an agent of vintage v.
Wealth is the sum of of the present discounted value of wages (human wealth, the present discounted value of expected future transfer payments from the government, and capital.
The Lagrangian for the problem can be written 
C(t) = 5tc(v,t)expE_rtp(s_v)dsJdv and if the government consumes no goods itself, the economy's capital
The underlying production function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in capital and labor, to exhibit diminishing returns to each factor, and to obey the Inada conditions.
-7-stock evolves according to (10) 
In perfect--foresight equilibrium, the expected real interest rate r(t) must equal the marginal product of capital Y'(K(t)] for all t.
Combination of (B) and (9) shows that the time derivative of aggregate consumption is (11) DC(t) = c(t,t)
in equilibrium. The first two terms on the right-hand side of (11) The system becomes quite simple under Blarichards (1985) additional assumptions that R = 1 (so that u(c) = log(c) ) , that cohorts are born without nonhuman wealth, and that all individuals of any age have the same human wealth
-8-where w(t) is the real wage at t. When R 1, the consumption function takes the form c(v,t) (+p)Ca(v,t)]. The (constant) population is just l/p and becaise aggregate human wealth (t) therefore equals h(t)/p and aggregate noniuman wealth equals the capital stock K(t) (11) becomes
This simple characterization of the aggregate dynamics is nnr.r-% 1 1 4 n , r 1 4 -k I r, 4 4 I, nnL,nrnmnn 4 e 4 4 £ £ n r n I, 4 4 1 1 , r r n r 4 TI TI UCIICI QLSf SIIQ'JpSSLCTUAC LI IIC 9UVCI III'CII UAC US CI CtlSCSSf CUIU £II o age. As we shall see later, differential taxation of this type is needed to support optimal growth paths as competitive equilibria. We next discuss the meaning of "optimality1 and the implied intertemporal resource allocation for a centrally-planned economy.
II. Time-Consistent Utilitarian Planning
In this section we describe the objective function of a utilitarian planner whose preferences admit time-consistent optimal plans. The planner is utilitarian in the sense that his welfare objective is a weighted sum of the utilities of all generations, including
those not yet born. Samuelson (1967 Samuelson ( . 1968 , building on a suggestion of Lerner (1959) , was the first to study utilitarian planning in an economy with finitelylived overlapping generations. In the model of Samuelson (1968) 
-c(t-1,t) In other words, for s ; 0, the consumption plan {c(t,t),c,t+1)) maximizing 9(0) subject to resource constraints does not maximize B(s) if followed from time s onward. The reason for this is that the .Bamuelson criterion does not attach an appropriate eght to tre welfare of the old generation alive at the start of the plan. In each periods, maximization of B(s) requires that consumption by the old be zero, even though this was not planned when 5(s-l) was max i ni z ed Samuelson (196) Samuelson (1967 Samuelson ( , 1968 .
Our planners objective is the sum of two components. First, there is the lifetime expected utility of the generation; to be born as measured from the moment of birth. Second, there is the expected utility, over the reaainder of their lifetimes, of those cohort; currently alive. The remaining expected utility of a cohort currently alive is. like that of a cohort to be born, measured from the perspective of its birthdate. If it is assumed in addition that the planner discounts generation; at a rate p > 0, the social welfare function is
at time t = 0. W(0) has an alternative interpretation. Its first component may be viewed as a weighted integral of instantaneous utilities actually enjoyed by members of future generations, discounted to the date of birth at the "risk-free" rate S. (Recall that there is no aquncertainty.> The second component is the weighted integral of utilite; to be enjoyed by living members of the current generations, also discounted to their birthdates at rate C. The planners maximization must be carried out subject to an initial capital endowment K (0) and the constraint (10), which is repeated here (after substitution from (9)) for converiience
It may appear unnatural to discount the utility of those already alive ack to their birthdates, rather than to the present. After all, the planner is concerned with their welfare from the present (time t = 0) onward. However, this discounting scheme is necessary for the time consistency of optimal intertemporal allocations. Unless those alive and those to be born are treated symmetrically, the planner has an incentive to cha9e the consumpti on previ ously planned for unborn eneraUors once they come into existence.'
To appreciate the time inconsistency problem consider the "natural social welfare function
In (14' the expected utility of the surviving members of current generations is measured from the perspective of time 0. If it is assumed for simplicity that p(n) is a constant p, then for I > 0,
An apparent alternative to (14) would treat current and future generations symmetrically by discounting all utility back to time 0. But this is equivalent to raising p to p + in (14).
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As noted above, Samuelson (1967) studies the maximization of a social welfare function similar to (14) in an overlappinggenerations model with deterministic two-period lifetimes. However, he assumes a finite planning horizon, no individual time preference, and no generational preference on the part of the planner. In
Bamuelsons framework, therefore, ' = 0, which would imply no distinction between (14) and (14').
-12- + J,(T). planner with preferences described by (14') will therefore be time inconsistent. Prriving at T with capital K(T), he will prefer to maximize V(T) and so will deviate from the plan that maximized
Yet another alternative to (14), particularly appealing when the instantaneous death probability is a constant p, is to treat all those alive at time zero as if they had just been born i.e., as if they were all of vintage zero. It is easily verified that this 'egalitarian" scheme, like (14'), generally yields a time-inconsistent optimum. The exception occurs when p = , so that the planners objective is identical to a special case of (14), that in which consumption is optimally equal across cohorts at any time.
The time consistency of plans maximizing W(0) subject to the An implication of our analysis is that the credibility of a planner will depend on the way he weights generations utilities. This complication is not found in the Cass-Koopmans framework with nonoverlapping generations. There, it is a matter of indifference whether the planner discounts instantaneous utility according to the time at which it is enjoyed or the generation that enjoys it. Here the distinction is 10 cruci al.
It should now be clear that there is a time-consistent analogue of the Samuelson criterion 3(0) which embodies the discounting convention incorporated in our welfare measure W(0). That criterion is CuCc(-l,-1),c(-l,0)J/} +3(0), which is maximized at time 0 given the (predetermined) consumption level c(-l,-1) enjoyed in their youth by those currently old.
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If one were to insist that optimal plans should be time consistent, our findings would give some guidance regarding admissible social welfare functions. This is reminiscent of Koopinans (196) discussion, where its is shown that a nonnegative planner's discount rate is required to ensure the existence of an optimal plan when population s growing. Note that our analysis would be unchanged if the discount rate applied by the planner to generation v at time t were expC-p(v-t)] (as in Cass and Koopmans) rather than exp[-pv].
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iii. The Optimal lIocation over Tise
The intartemporal resource allocation chosen by a time-consistent utilitarian planner is studied in this section. That optrnum is qualItatively similar to the one arising in the familiar Cass-Koopeans-Ramsey qrowth problem with identical nonoverlapping generations, but here the generational discount factor p determines the long-run marginal product of capital, as suggested by Samuelson (1965) .
It is easiest to salve the planners problem of maximizing (14) subject to (is) by the method of optimal control (rrow and Kurz, 1970).
4fter changing the order of integration, (14) may be written in the form
Equation (16) yields yet another interpretation of the planners objective. W(0) is just the discounted integral, over all future dates, of a weighted sum of instantaneous utilities of those currently alive. The planner applies the individual subjective discount factor S in weighting the aggregate utility enjoyed on different dates. IR adding up utilities enjoyed on a given date by agents of different ages, vintage is discounted at the net rate S -p.11
Let (t) denote the costate variable for the problem of maximizing (16) subject to (1). Then the associated Hamiltanian is written
The criterion (16) may be viewed as a discounted sum of static 'Senthamite" social welfare functions again, see Samuelson (1967) , Observe that even if u(.) is bounded the summands in (16) can be unbounded if the nenerational discount factor p is sufficiently large. In general, therefore, an optimal plan need not exist: one needs to assume that the welfare weight attached to previous generations does not grow 'too quickly" relative to the rate at which members of those generations die and S. This problem can be avoided by postulating a finite age n such that F(n) = 1. Existence of an optimum is assumed in the discussion below.
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Necessary conditions for an ptimal plan are
plus the equation of motion for the costate,
Equation (18) implies that at any time t consumption evolves across cohorts according to the equation
(.20) c(v,t)/v = -{u'Cc(v,t)3/u1tc(v,t)])( -p).
By (18) and (19), the consumption of a given cohort evolves over time
What is the meaning of equation (20)? 4s was noted earlier, the difference -p can be viewed as the net rate at which the planner discounts a given cohort's welfare according to its age. if an allocation is optimal, there must be no incentive to shift consumption between cohorts at any time t. But this implies that the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption changes as age rises (i.e., as v falls) must equal -p. This is what equation (20) states. The case p = yields the '1egalitarian" plan mentioned in the previous section, under which all individuals have the same consumption level at any point in time.
The intertemporal allocation condition (21) Aggregate consumption at time t may therefore be expressed as Differentiation shows that the coefficient of c(t,t) in (23) is constant cier time. Thus, aggregate consumption and the consumption of the newly born are proportional, so that (24> DC(t)/C(t) = Dc(t,t)/c(t,t).
Combining (21) and (22), we find that
Epuatians (24) and (25) now show that the central planner will cause aggregate consumption to evolve according to the rule
This is identical to the condition that would govern the evolution of aggregate consumption in the standard Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey representative-agent planning model with discount rate p.
Equations (15) and (26) It is noteworthy that condition (27) is the same as that derived by Samuelson (1968) in a model where the planner is constrained to pursue a time-consistent plan. Indeed conditions (20) and (21) also have rn 4rmrwrn-L
The main results of the constant relative risk aversi on case can be generalized. In particular the steady state described by (27) and (28) is independent of the instantaneous utility function u(.), and the consumptions of all cohorts rise or fall inonotonically along the transition path. While it is no longer possible in general to express the economy's dynamics in terms of aggregate consumption and the capital stocks an alternative two-variable representation can be developed.
These assertions are established as follows. Use necessary condition (18) to write c(v,t) as
Recall that aggregate consumption is given by equation (9). After a change of variables from v to n = t -v (i.e., from 'vintage' to "age") (9) becomes C(t) = !c(t-n,t)expC-fp
so that upon substitution of (29) we have (29) and (30) imply that aggregate consumption can be written as a declining function of q(t), CCT)(t)]. Equation (15) may now be expressed in The form (31) DK(t) = YEK(t)) -Ctq(t)].
Differentiation af q(t) and application of (19) show that
Equation (32) is identical to the dynamic equation for the costate variable in the standard representative-agent model with time-preference rate p.
The phase diagram for the system in r?(t) and K(t> described by enuations (31) and (32) is shown in figure 2. Because C(q*) = K*, where q* is the steady-state value of q, aggregate consumption and the capital stock converge toward the stationary values C* and K* defined by (27) and (2B). The qualitative behavior of consumption is the same as in the constant relative risk aversion case of figure 1, both in the aggregate and at the cohort level.
IV. Optimal Fiscal Policy
The goal of this section is to show how fiscal policy can be used to decentralize optimal utilitarian plans in the competitive economy of section 1. Because the competitive equilibrium without government intervention is efficient1 only lump sum taxes need be used to generate the optimal plan as a competitive equilibrium. However, the tax an individual pays will in general vary according to his age and calendar time. To keep the analysis simple we consider only balanced-budget fiscal policy. Equivalent policies could involve government debt issue,
but this is not discussed explicitly below.
To make the main points it is sufficient to work with a special case ot the model, that studied by Blancard (1985) . It is therefore assumed once aoain that the instantaneous death probability is a constant p, that the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic, and that individuals are born with human wealth only. The last paragraphs of section I discuss individual and aggregate behavior in this case when there is no government intervention, and the reader may wish to review them before proceeding.
Given an initial capital stock K(O) , the optimal plan generates paths CK(t) for capital and {C(t)}.3 for aggregate consumption.
These in turn yield paths for the shadow real interest rate r(t) = 'I'EK(t)), the shadow wage w(t) = p'YCK(t)] -K(t>Y'CK(t)J)4 and the shadow present value of per capita wage income h(t) (given by (12), and the same for all agents alive at time t) . To decentralize the optimal intertemooral allocation, the government must endow each agent at birth with a transfer stream inducing the desired consumption levels when the shadow price paths Cr(t)}0 and CW(t))ç3 are expected. Let T(v,t) denote the transfer payment received by an agent of vintage v at time t, and let b(v,t) denote the present value of these payments at time t given the expected real-interest rate path. We will consider fiscal policies having the property that the qovernments budget is balanced on each date t4 so that net transfers to the public are zero: log(c); and, if optimality condition (20) holds at t = 0,
Since aggregate consumption at t = 0 must equal the optimal level C(0) integration of (35) over the population leads to
Equation 35) implies that the transfer streams of those born before t = 0 have present values given by
After the transfer streams for those alive at t = 0 are announced by the government, its only remaining choice variables are the transfer payments to be made to those born on subsequent dates. Suppose these are chosen in such a way that the budget is balanced on each date (i.e.
(33) holds) and In the case v < 0, (37) implies that (40) holds for all t 0. Equations (20) and (21) follow immediately upon differentiation of (40).
For the sake of intuition, it is useful to analyze the balancedbudget fiscal policy that supports the steady state pictured in figure 1 as a competitive equilibrium. ssume, therefore, that the capital stock is initially at the level K* defined by equation (27).
Let us first ask why K* would generally not be a steady-state equilibrium without government intervention. To be concrete, take the 
Integrating (43) over the entire population, we find that aggregate
Equate the value of C(t) given by (45) to Y(K*) and recall (44. This
To make sense of the implied fiscal policy we need to interpret the left-hand side of (46). 4fter hanqing the order of integration, this nay be written in the farm (47) !T(n)Cfexp(-ps)expE-(p+p)(n-s)]ds3dn
The left-hand side of (47) is just a weighted sum of the transfer payments made at each age n. The weiht given to (n) is in turn a sum, each term of which equals the number of agents in a cohort of age n-s (s 0) times the discount factor each applies to 'r(n). By the government budget constraint (42) (46) and (47) can be combined to yield a formula giving the optimal present value of government transfers at birth Individual consumption is flat at pY(K*) , and a declining path of transfers induces a flow demand for capital just equal to flow supply "bequeathed to the economy by those who die.
V. Conclusion
This paper has studied the problen of time-consistent utilitarian planning in an economy where individual lifetimes are stochastic.
dynamically consistent optimal allocation is characterized by a generalized version of Samuelson's (1968) 'two-part golden rule". However, the economy's aggregate dynamics are quite similar to those arising in the planning models of Cass (1965) , Koopmans (1965), and Ramsey (1928) which postulate homogeneous nonoverlapping generations. Through appropriate lump-sum transfers, the optimal allocation can be realized as
